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1.   INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, private sector managers in both Canada and the United States have expressed 
concerns about a “thickening” of the Canada-U.S. border with resulting adverse consequences for 
continued integration of the North American economy and, more specifically, for Canada-U.S. 
trade.1  Several factors have been identified as particularly relevant contributors to higher costs 
associated with bilateral trade.  They include more frequent and closer inspection of goods crossing 
the border owing to stricter health and safety regulations and heightened security against acts of 
terrorism.  The added delays and uncertainties imposed upon commercial shipments, particularly 
from Canada to the U.S., arguably add to the costs of shipping goods across the border, thereby 
discouraging trade at the margin.  
While research studies have not been unequivocal in identifying adverse impacts on bilateral trade 
intensity, there is evidence that since the 9/11 terrorist attacks,  the real (inflation-adjusted) value of 
Canada-U.S. trade flows has  fallen short of what might be expected given historical economic 
experience. Globerman and Storer (2008, 2009) and Grady (2008) identify post-9/11 border security 
procedures as contributing significantly to bilateral trade “shortfalls,” especially shortfalls in 
Canadian exports to the United States.  Other authors have directly identified significant additional 
costs associated with post-9/11 border security regulations.2  The costs arise from various sources, 
including administration and clerical burdens associated with satisfying more demanding reporting 
requirements for shipping goods and qualifying for special “trusted traveler” programs, delays 
resulting from increased inspections of goods in transit, and increased inventory levels needed to 
ensure timely shipments in the face of unpredictable border crossing times, among others. 
Governments at all levels in Canada and the United States have implemented policies to address at 
least some of the sources of the increased costs adversely affecting bilateral trade. For example, road 
and port infrastructure programs have been undertaken to expand the physical capacity of individual 
border crossing points on both sides of the border.3 The infrastructure programs have involved 
planning and funding by agencies of the two federal governments, as well as by states, provinces and 
individual cities. On the other hand, programs associated with expediting commercial and passenger 
traffic in the context of border security procedures remain the sole responsibility of the federal 
governments, as do initiatives related to staffing and managing border ports.4  Since national security 
is primarily a responsibility of the federal government, it seems reasonable for administration of 
ports, including interior land ports, to be centralized in the federal government bureaucracy; 
however, to the extent that the costs and consequences of relatively uniform border security and 
related policies differ across geographic locations, such centralization could lead to inefficiencies and 
regional inequities. At the least, relevant differences across ports by geographic locations should be 
acknowledged by federal government decision-makers, whether or not decision-making 
responsibility is devolved to lower levels of government.5 Where relevant differences across border 
crossing locations can be incorporated into policies to reduce cost burdens on bilateral trade without 
                                                            
1 For some discussions of these concerns, see Goldfarb (2007), Ackleson (2009) and Sands (2009). 
2 The relevant studies are summarized and reviewed in Globerman and Storer (2008). 
3 Ackleson (2009), among others, highlights an inadequate number of entry lanes and of associated staffing at land 
border crossing ports as limiting the volume of bilateral trade flows. 
4 See Globerman and Storer (2008) and Sands (2009) for a discussion of a number of initiatives, including the Free  
   and Secure Trade (FAST) program. 
5 In this context, relevant differences are those that affect transportation costs in a significant way. For example,  
   Bradbury and Turbeville (2008) highlight differences in overall trade volumes, as well as in the composition of  
   trade flows, that exist across various Canada-U.S. border crossing points.  
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compromising national security, some port-specific variations in administration would seem to make 
sense. 
Sands (2009), among others, has called for a substantial increase in responsibility on the part of local 
and regional communities to shape border security policies and procedures in recognition of 
important regional differences in economic conditions, the history of cooperation between state and 
provincial governments, the population sizes of border communities and so forth.6  Empirical 
evidence that trade shortfalls in the post-9/11 period vary across major land ports along the Canada-
U.S. border provides some indirect support for claims that a “one-size-fits-all” program to ensure 
security of commercial shipments from terrorism and/or health risks is potentially inefficient and 
possibly inequitable for specific groups of producers and consumers, depending upon their 
geographic locations.7  Unfortunately, the evidence on the geographic impacts of government policy 
on cross-border shipping costs is extremely limited, so that the practical importance of the policy 
changes recommended by Sands and others is unclear.  
This study is intended to help address our limited understanding of how the costs of transporting 
commercial goods between Canada and the United States differ geographically. Specifically, our 
study addresses the question of whether and by how much the cost of shipping goods from Canada 
to the United States differs across geographic locations in the United States.  Since concerns 
continue to be expressed about the impacts of post-9/11 border security measures on transportation 
costs, our study also identifies whether and how the costs of shipping goods from Canada to the 
United States have changed over time, particularly in the post-2001 period. 
While ideally we would like to identify and assess differences in shipping costs at the level of the 
individual port, the available data do not permit this level of disaggregation. Specifically, the data 
required to estimate shipping costs are taken from the United States International Trade 
Commission, and they are reported on the basis of country of origin, commodity and customs 
district of entry into the United States. Hence, the analysis of shipping costs must be undertaken at 
the customs district level. For our analysis, we focused initially on the nine U.S. customs districts 
containing land ports on the Canada-U.S. border.  We subsequently dropped the Duluth customs 
district from our sample, because changes in the identity of the ports included in this district that 
took place during our sample time period made analysis of transportation costs over the sample time 
period unreliable for that district.8 
Our study adds to existing knowledge of post-9/11 border security developments and Canada-U.S. 
economic integration in several ways. One is its use of a measure of transportation cost that has not 
been employed in previous research focusing on the impacts of post-9/11 border security 
developments. Ultimately, concerns expressed about a “thickening” of the Canada-U.S. border relate 
to increased (direct and indirect) costs associated with shipping goods, particularly from Canada to 
the United States. To our knowledge, our study is the first to use time series data on transportation 
costs in order to identify whether those costs increased in the post-9/11 time period. Second is our 
systematic effort to identify whether a thickening of the border, as measured by transportation costs, 
has been relatively uniform across the Canada-U.S. border or whether some locations have 
experienced more significant thickening relative to other locations. Third is our evaluation of 
transportation cost differences across commodities and whether the differences identified are 
                                                            
6 Lovecraft (2007) makes a similar argument in the context of Canada-U.S. environmental management. 
7 See Globerman and Storer (2009) for evidence of differences across ports in the impacts of post-9/11 border  
   security procedures on trade flows. 
8 The full set of eight customs districts and the ports within each district are reported in Appendix 1. 
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plausibly related to post-9/11 border security developments.  Any such differences might help 
explain variations in transportation costs across customs districts, including differences in the post-
9/11 period.  
In summary, we find some evidence that transportation costs associated with importing goods from 
Canada into the United States declined more rapidly in the pre-9/11 period than in the post-9/11 
period.  This finding adds to the evidence that post-9/11 border security-related developments have 
thickened the border between Canada and the United States.  We also find significant differences 
across U.S. customs districts in the behavior of transportation costs over time.  Specifically, there is 
evidence that adverse movements in transportation costs in the post-9/11 period were more severe 
for some customs districts than for others.  Furthermore, the differences appear to be more closely 
related to the capability of ports within customs districts to respond to border-related security 
developments than to differences in the mix or nature of the commodities passing through the 
ports.  This finding provides some support for recommendations that U.S. policies dealing with 
border security incorporate regional differences into the policy-making process.  
The rest of our study proceeds as follows.  Section 2 describes our transportation cost metric.  
Section 3 discusses how transportation costs for U.S. imports from Canada have varied over time 
and across customs districts.  Section 4 examines the behavior of the cost ratio at the individual 
commodity level, both for all customs districts, as well as for individual customs districts.  Section 5 
identifies and evaluates other characteristics of customs districts that might influence the behavior of 
transport costs, particularly when comparing the pre- and post-2001 experiences.  Finally, a 
summary and conclusion section is presented in Section 6. 
2.  MEASUREMENT OF SHIPPING COSTS 
Our broad measure of shipping costs follows the method used by Frankel (1997) and Anderson and 
van Wincoop (2004).  The measure is calculated by comparing U.S. importers’ reported customs 
value of imports including freight and insurance costs (the CIF value) to the values reported 
excluding freight and insurance (the FOB value).9  Presumably, the costs created by security-related 
procedures, as well as regulatory-related obligations imposed upon Canadian exporters will be 
manifested over time in higher costs of freight and, possibly, insurance as well. For example, the 
documented costs associated with longer waiting times to cross the border, as well as adjustments to 
shipping patterns in response to increased uncertainty about the time required to cross the border, 
presumably will contribute to a higher ratio of CIF value to FOB value (henceforth the ratio) to the 
extent that the higher costs are passed through to importers.10  
The transport cost ratio data that we use in this study are derived from import documents such as 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection Form 7501.  These documents require importers of record to 
disclose separate figures for the commercial value of their imports and for the combined cost of 
freight and insurance charges.  For U.S. imports from Canada, reported customs charges can include 
both foreign inland freight charges and post-importation freight costs.  The inclusion of pre- and 
post-importation freight and insurance charges means that changes in our transport cost ratios will 
reflect some combination of pure variations in the cost of crossing the border and fluctuations in 
                                                            
9 All variables used in this study, as well as the sources for the variables, are reported in Appendix 2. Technically,  
   the ratio is defined as the CIF value minus the FOB value divided by the FOB value multiplied by 100 or [(CIF – 
  FOB)/FOB] x 100.  
10 For a summary of evidence concerning increased security-related transportation costs incurred by Canadian  
    exporters related to shipping goods across the border, see Globerman and Storer (2008) and Goodchild,  
    Globerman and Albrecht (2008). 
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other transportation cost factors such as fuel costs or the distances traveled within Canada and the 
United States.  While we have no direct way to control for changes in factors such as distance 
traveled between the points of origin and destination, we will minimize the potential impact of these 
factors by comparing transport cost ratios before and after 9/11.  There is little reason to believe 
that shipping distances for Canadian exports changed in a systematic way after 2001. Furthermore, 
any changes in transportation distances that are uniform across customs districts will not affect our 
analysis, because we focus on transport cost differences over time between customs districts.  In a 
later section of this paper, we will check the robustness of our results by examining the fraction of 
imports that clear at ports located away from the physical border.  To anticipate the results of this 
exercise, we find little evidence that changes in shipping distances explain the evolving nature of our 
transport cost ratios. 
Our calculated ratio implicitly captures a variety of potential influences on shipping costs.  Perhaps 
the most obvious shipping cost determinant is the nature of the goods being shipped. All other 
things constant, heavy and bulky goods will cost more to ship than light and compact goods. Hence, 
low value-to-weight goods will have higher calculated ratios than high value-to-weight goods. 
Obviously, the greater the distance over which goods are shipped, the higher the shipping costs, 
other things constant. Transportation companies facing greater competition both within and across 
transportation modes are likely to charge lower mark-ups than those facing limited competition. 
Such differences in competitive conditions should also be reflected in the calculated ratio. 
Productivity changes in shipping, and other activities related to logistics, will affect the calculated 
ratio as well.11  Thus, it seems reasonable to expect that shipping costs will differ across North-South 
transportation corridors to the extent that those corridors differ with respect to factors such as 
volume and composition of commodity shipments, transport modalities used and so forth.  
Shipping costs may also change over time depending upon changes in these factors, as well as 
changes in productivity.   
Furthermore, if changes in factors such as productivity are not uniform across geographical 
locations, they might contribute to observed differences across locations when comparing pre- and 
post-9/11 time periods. In this case, it might be an error to infer that post-9/11 border security 
developments are the main cause of location differences in transportation costs over time. In later 
sections of this report, we consider evidence addressing the broad issue of what factors might be 
contributing to regional differences in transportation costs in the pre- and post-9/11 period.  
In the next section of this study, we report data on the behavior of the ratio over time for our 
sample of customs districts.  
3.  THE BEHAVIOR OF THE RATIO OVER TIME AND BY CUSTOMS DISTRICT 
Table 1 lists the eight major customs districts in our study and reports the total value of imports 
from Canada (in nominal U.S. dollars) for each district for the years 1989-2008. Table 2 reports the 
percentage increase in imports on an annual basis for 1990 through 2008 for each of the customs 
districts. Clearly, the eight customs districts in our sample differ in terms of absolute volume of 
imports processed. Furthermore, import activity increased at different rates across our sample of 
customs districts over the period 1990-2008. 
Figure 1 reports the calculated values of the transportation cost ratio for total imports from Canada 
crossing through land ports within each customs district in each of the years from 1989-2008. There  
                                                            
11 Frankel (1997) and Hummels (2001), among others, identify declining shipping costs over time linked to                




Nominal Import Volumes by Customs District 
 
District 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Buffalo, NY $17,037,289,362 $17,383,987,105 $16,816,407,954 $18,982,140,625 $22,110,639,441 
Detroit, MI $33,364,276,392 $32,833,409,012 $33,154,481,398 $36,768,036,210 $41,562,488,614 
Great Falls, MT $3,081,675,598 $3,607,705,152 $3,544,342,572 $3,679,535,124 $4,194,866,663 
Ogdensburg, NY $8,411,547,900 $8,950,921,496 $9,078,612,274 $9,226,461,744 $10,456,217,204 
Pembina, ND $3,852,927,012 $4,022,141,952 $3,973,318,721 $4,403,483,805 $5,145,147,669 
Portland, ME $2,226,446,040 $2,425,226,975 $2,323,999,011 $2,293,150,751 $2,518,500,769 
Seattle, WA $4,105,656,465 $4,285,463,067 $4,158,274,660 $4,730,920,224 $5,365,951,418 
St. Albans, VT $3,807,546,061 $4,728,633,543 $4,735,325,273 $4,811,828,896 $4,959,955,634 
8 District Total $75,887,364,830 $78,237,488,302 $77,784,761,863 $84,895,557,379 $96,313,767,412 
District 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Buffalo, NY $24,820,943,896 $26,347,872,305 $26,572,462,119 $27,162,900,886 $32,488,541,836 
Detroit, MI $51,123,617,281 $57,947,797,230 $62,614,727,706 $68,498,718,976 $68,123,193,259 
Great Falls, MT $4,979,892,887 $4,682,383,808 $5,203,354,011 $5,949,680,220 $6,022,934,292 
Ogdensburg, NY $11,276,739,118 $13,074,368,869 $14,408,306,685 $15,656,082,763 $16,661,844,608 
Pembina, ND $5,922,682,974 $6,979,234,674 $7,287,783,241 $7,574,759,161 $7,878,654,324 
Portland, ME $2,716,848,300 $3,079,690,313 $3,373,799,638 $3,654,227,363 $3,677,831,573 
Seattle, WA $6,196,371,291 $6,719,748,776 $8,039,688,654 $9,574,898,490 $10,266,777,618 
St. Albans, VT $5,541,206,445 $6,628,011,931 $7,054,365,489 $7,016,692,195 $7,439,131,685 
8 District Total $112,578,302,192 $125,459,107,906 $134,554,487,543 $145,087,960,054 $152,558,909,195 
District 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Buffalo, NY $35,806,247,474 $34,079,525,132 $31,249,022,312 $31,060,902,500 $32,173,669,651 
Detroit, MI $78,111,576,373 $87,508,068,378 $82,747,424,603 $84,526,966,423 $89,160,283,315 
Great Falls, MT $7,641,030,100 $10,869,408,219 $14,471,616,323 $12,265,260,683 $14,325,982,210 
Ogdensburg, NY $18,084,926,599 $21,791,137,585 $20,123,639,264 $19,226,485,809 $19,427,481,037 
Pembina, ND $8,479,164,708 $10,691,027,708 $9,999,325,157 $9,340,203,496 $9,042,452,986 
Portland, ME $4,198,570,627 $5,018,693,428 $5,186,388,972 $5,060,710,190 $5,397,182,489 
Seattle, WA $11,852,765,533 $14,653,489,804 $12,614,953,352 $10,349,675,930 $11,416,432,188 
St. Albans, VT $7,817,028,637 $8,583,307,026 $8,468,931,436 $7,681,239,785 $8,786,683,540 
8 District Total $171,991,310,051 $193,194,657,280 $184,861,301,419 $179,511,444,816 $189,730,167,416 
District 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Buffalo, NY $36,798,886,597 $38,079,329,299 $40,174,048,089 $40,262,083,633 $40,734,639,988 
Detroit, MI $100,296,811,873 $108,922,392,639 $111,672,485,985 $111,837,876,135 $102,851,069,946 
Great Falls, MT $17,189,393,299 $21,348,311,762 $21,761,137,374 $23,461,003,021 $28,345,134,577 
Ogdensburg, NY $21,839,874,991 $25,304,185,585 $26,842,354,609 $26,174,755,567 $27,360,722,103 
Pembina, ND $10,653,134,294 $12,403,917,176 $13,647,725,917 $14,658,560,605 $16,989,357,940 
Portland, ME $6,153,639,059 $6,918,972,840 $7,135,203,564 $6,835,661,925 $7,428,941,714 
Seattle, WA $13,336,843,884 $15,193,962,125 $15,906,899,872 $15,767,143,027 $17,196,899,267 
St. Albans, VT $9,292,432,099 $11,436,236,877 $10,241,561,173 $9,984,955,960 $9,273,359,276 
8 District Total $215,561,016,096 $239,607,308,303 $247,381,416,583 $248,982,039,873 $250,180,124,811 
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TABLE 2:  
Annual Growth Rates for General Import Volumes by Customs District 
 
District 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Buffalo, NY 2.0% -3.3% 12.9% 16.5% 12.3% 6.2% 0.9% 2.2% 19.6% 10.2% -4.8% -8.3% -0.6% 3.6% 14.4% 3.5% 5.5% 0.2% 1.2% 
Detroit, MI -1.6% 1.0% 10.9% 13.0% 23.0% 13.3% 8.1% 9.4% -0.5% 14.7% 12.0% -5.4% 2.2% 5.5% 12.5% 8.6% 2.5% 0.1% -8.0% 
Great Falls, 
MT 17.1% -1.8% 3.8% 14.0% 18.7% -6.0% 11.1% 14.3% 1.2% 26.9% 42.3% 33.1% 
-
15.2% 16.8% 20.0% 24.2% 1.9% 7.8% 20.8% 
Ogdensburg, 
NY 6.4% 1.4% 1.6% 13.3% 7.8% 15.9% 10.2% 8.7% 6.4% 8.5% 20.5% -7.7% -4.5% 1.0% 12.4% 15.9% 6.1% -2.5% 4.5% 
Pembina, 
ND 4.4% -1.2% 10.8% 16.8% 15.1% 17.8% 4.4% 3.9% 4.0% 7.6% 26.1% -6.5% -6.6% -3.2% 17.8% 16.4% 10.0% 7.4% 15.9% 
Portland, 
ME 8.9% -4.2% -1.3% 9.8% 7.9% 13.4% 9.5% 8.3% 0.6% 14.2% 19.5% 3.3% -2.4% 6.6% 14.0% 12.4% 3.1% -4.2% 8.7% 




18.0% 10.3% 16.8% 13.9% 4.7% -0.9% 9.1% 
St. Albans, 
VT 24.2% 0.1% 1.6% 3.1% 11.7% 19.6% 6.4% -0.5% 6.0% 5.1% 9.8% -1.3% -9.3% 14.4% 5.8% 23.1% 
-
10.4% -2.5% -7.1% 
8 District 
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is a clear and dramatic upward spike in the calculated ratio for every customs district from 1989 to 
1990. The sharp increase was ostensibly due to a dramatic (almost 30%) increase in the price of oil 
between the two years.  Hence, a more meaningful picture of changes in transportation cost over 
time would be gleaned by abstracting from this initial large increase in oil prices so as to focus on the 
data for 1990-2008.  
In this regard, it can be seen from Figure 1 that the transportation cost ratio differs in absolute value 
across districts.  Of more interest are the differences across customs districts in the movement of 
the ratio over time.  For example, for a number of districts (Buffalo, Detroit, Great Falls and 
Pembina), the ratio decreases more or less constantly over the full sample period with the exception 
of a modest increase in 2001-2002.  It seems reasonable to infer that this latter increase was related 
to border security developments and the associated border crossing delays in the immediate 
aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks; however, in the case of some other districts (Portland, 
Seattle, and St. Albans) the trend in the declining ratio prior to 2001 does not continue in the post-
2001 period.   
For all imports aggregated across the eight sample customs districts, Figure 2 shows that the ratio 
decreased from 2002 onwards, following an increase from 2001-2002; however, the decrease is 
noticeably slower in the period 2002-2008 compared to the period 1990-2001.12  The continued 
decrease in the ratio post-2002 might reflect the fact that other factors contributing to lower 
transportation costs more than offset the specific impact of border security-related procedures post- 
9/11 on transportation costs. Productivity gains in transportation are an obvious candidate in this 
regard. Estimates for the United States show that labor productivity in local trucking grew by 5.2% 
per year, while productivity in rail grew by 5.1% per year over the period 1990-2000 (U.S. 
Department of Transportation, 2003). A continuation of such productivity improvements in the 
post-2000 period could help explain why the calculated ratio continued to decline for most of the 
sample districts.13  
Hence, the decrease in the ratio for most districts post-2001 should not be interpreted as evidence 
that border-related security measures had no significant and lasting impact on shipping costs for 
goods imported into the U.S. from Canada. As noted above, productivity gains in the transportation 
industry may have offset any measurable cost increases associated with post-9/11 border security 
developments. In addition, border delays and associated uncertainties may have led to a substitution 
away from goods with relatively high shipping costs to those with lower shipping costs, a 
phenomenon identified by Hummels (2001), among others. Finally, shortfalls in Canadian exports to 
the United States could have contributed to the observed decreases in the ratio post-2001 by 
reducing congestion at border crossings and increasing pressure on carriers to charge lower freight 
rates. 
Whatever the factors influencing transportation costs, the data summarized in Figures 1 and 2 
suggest that there are important differences in the pre- and post-2001 behavior of the transportation 
cost ratio. Furthermore, differences in the pre- and post-2001 behavior of the ratio are not identical 
across customs districts.  Specifically, the trend towards lower transportation costs appears to have 
                                                            
12 This is seen by comparing the flatter slope of the curve from 2000-2008 to the steeper slope from 1990-2001. 
13 Lim and Lovell (2009) provide evidence of productivity improvements in rail transportation over the more recent  
    period 1996-2003.  
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slackened in the later period compared to the earlier period.  Furthermore, the slackening is more 
marked for some districts than for others. 
Differences in the behavior of the ratio over time for the aggregate of customs districts, as well as 
across customs districts, are further illustrated through regression analysis. We first separated the 
sample time period into two sub-periods: 1990-2000 and 2001-2008. The time periods were chosen 
to correspond as closely as possible to pre and post-9/11 border crossing conditions. For the sample 
of customs districts as a whole, as well as for each individual customs district, a simple linear model 
was estimated for each sub-period, where the dependent variable is the calculated ratio and the 
independent variable is a linear time trend. The results of the regression analysis are reported in 
Table 3. Specifically, the estimated coefficient for the linear time trend is reported for each district 
for the two sub-periods. It can be seen that there was a statistically significant (at the ten-percent 
level) downward trend in shipping costs for seven of the eight districts in the first sub-period.14 
Conversely, Ogdensburg has a notable increasing trend in shipping costs.  
The downward trend in shipping costs continues for most districts in the post-2001 period; 
however, the estimated negative time trend coefficient is statistically insignificant for Portland and 
St. Albans, and it is positive, albeit statistically insignificant, for Seattle. The smaller (in absolute 
value) negative estimated time trend coefficient for Pembina in the second sample period  is not 
significantly different from zero but, when comparing the second sub-period to the first, the change 
in the time trend coefficient is statistically significant. Hence, for almost half the sample, the trend to 
lower shipping costs was slowed or even reversed in the post-2001 period. There appears to be no 
change in the trend for Buffalo, Detroit and Great Falls, whereas there is a statistically significant 
reversal of the pre-9/11 trend towards higher shipping costs for Ogdensburg. 
Table 4 reports the results of a regression model in which a coefficient is explicitly estimated for a 
change in the time trend value of the ratio starting in 2001.  Specifically, Table 4 reports the 
estimated coefficient for the change in the time trend for each of the eight sample districts along 
with the statistical significance levels of the estimated coefficients.  A positive coefficient indicates 
that the ratio decline was slowing in the post-2001 period compared to the pre-2001 period.  A 
negative coefficient suggests that the decline was actually faster post-2001.  When estimated across 
all imports, it is seen that only one customs district (Ogdensburg) experienced a faster and 
statistically significant decline in the transportation cost ratio post-2001; however, four districts 
(Portland, St. Alban’s, Seattle and Pembina) experienced a slower (and statistically significant) 
decreasing trend in the ratio post-2001.  
In summary, there is some evidence of a post-9/11 slowing of the declining trend in transportation 
costs across our sample of customs districts, with specific customs districts experiencing a 
particularly marked change in this trend relationship. Such differences suggest that post-9/11 border 
security-related developments imposed larger or smaller disadvantages across regions in terms of 
facilitating imports from Canada depending upon the location of border crossings.  However, before 
drawing any strong inference along these lines, it is worth looking at the behavior of the cost ratio at 




                                                            
14 Clearly, the absolute values of the estimated coefficients differ across the districts; however, it cannot be  
    determined if the  differences are statistically significant. 
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TABLE 3:  




*Percentages shown in parentheses are significance levels for the null hypothesis that the 
coefficient is equal to zero. 
 
**Time trend coefficients are shown in bold italics when the coefficient values are significantly 
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  TABLE 4: 
Estimated Coefficients for Changes in Time Trend of Transport Cost Ratio Post-2001 
 
District Estimated Coefficient*  
Portland 0.061 
(8%) 














All 8 Districts 0.021 
(6.2%) 
 
* Numbers in parentheses are the probabilities that 




Frankel’s Measure: Top Commodities 
All Districts – Various Years 
 
HTS-2 Code Ratio 1995 Ratio 2002 Ratio 2008 
1 1.9 1.5 1.0 
3 1.1 0.7 0.5 
27 2.4 1.4 0.7 
39 2.1 2.3 1.7 
44 4.2 3.1 2.6 
47 2.9 3.4 2.7 
48 3.0 3.5 2.8 
76 1.1 1.7 0.6 
84 1.2 0.8 0.7 
85 1.2 0.7 0.8 
87 1.0 0.6 0.5 
98 1.5 1.1 1.0 
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4.  BEHAVIOR OF THE RATIO BY COMMODITY AND BY DISTRICT 
Table 5 reports the transportation cost ratio value for 12 two-digit HTS commodities for selected 
years aggregated across all of the sample customs districts.15  It is unsurprising to observe that the 
transportation cost ratio varies across commodities.  It is also not surprising to observe that the ratio 
varies over time for the various commodities.  In the majority (62%) of cases, the ratio declines over 
the period 1995-2002.  Such decreases in the ratio are consistent with productivity improvements in 
the transportation sector.  While virtually all commodities exhibit decreases in the ratio over the 
period 2002-2008, the decreases in the ratio appear to be more modest in the 2002-2008 period.  
This observation is consistent with our econometric evidence discussed earlier, which showed a 
flattening of the declining transportation cost ratio in the post-2001 time period. 
Differences across commodities in the transportation cost ratio are further illustrated in Figures 3-
10.  Specifically, the ratios are plotted for eight of the commodities listed in Table 5 over the sample 
time period.  The data are reported for each of our sample customs districts.  Several inferences can 
be readily drawn.  One is that changes in the ratio over time differ across customs districts.  For 
example, the ratio for mineral fuels is virtually unchanged over much of the sample period in the 
case of Ogdensburg, whereas it decreases, increases and then decreases again quite noticeably for 
Buffalo.  In the case of paper products, the ratio is noticeably lower in the post-2001 period for the 
Portland district, whereas it is higher in the post-2001 period for St. Albans and Ogdensburg. 
A second inference is that changes in the ratio over time are not identical across commodities within 
any customs district.  For example, there are marked increases and decreases in the ratio for Buffalo 
over the sample period in the case of mineral fuels.  In contrast, the ratio is relatively unchanged 
other than the increase from 1989-1990 for plastics in the case of Buffalo.  Conversely, while the 
ratio for mineral fuels is relatively invariant in the case of Ogdensburg, the ratio for plastics increases 
fairly steadily and noticeably for Ogdensburg. 
In summary, the information presented in Figures 3-10 supports the assumption that transport costs 
differ across commodities.  Hence, one must acknowledge the possibility that the flattening-out of 
the declining transportation cost ratio post-2001 might reflect a changing import commodity mix 
over time.  Specifically, there could have been a relative increase in the share of imports accounted 
for by relatively transportation cost-intensive commodities in the post-9/11 period.  
4.1   Changes in Overall Commodity Mix 
Table 6 reports the two-digit HTS codes for the five leading U.S. commodity imports from Canada 
for selected years.  Clearly, there are overlaps in commodity categories across the sample years.  In 
particular, commodities 27 (mineral fuels), 84 (mechanical equipment) and 87 (automotive products) 
combined account for almost 50% or more of total imports in each sample year.  The fact that the 
import commodity mix over time was dominated by the same relatively small set of commodities 
suggests that changes in the commodity mix of U.S. imports from Canada are unlikely to be a major 
contributor to the behavior of the overall transport cost ratio over time, although the change in the 
relative positions of the top two commodities between 2004 and 2008 does have some potential 
impact on the level of the ratio and its trend over time. 
                                                            
15 These commodity groups constitute relatively large Canadian export categories accounting for 68% of U.S.  
    imports from Canada in 2008. 
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TABLE 6: 
Top five HTS Import Commodities 
(All Customs Districts) 
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4.2   Changes in Commodity Mix by Districts 
Our analysis in the previous section identified differences in the cost ratio across different customs 
districts over time.  Such differences reflect some combination of changes over time in the mix of 
commodities passing through the ports within each district and changes in the cost ratio for specific 
commodities over time within individual customs districts.  To the extent that the commodity mixes 
are relatively constant over time, the different post-2001 cost ratio experiences of the different 
customs districts are consistent with the notion that some districts were more adversely affected 
than others by post-9/11 border security developments, given their mix of commodity imports. 
Table 7 reports the five leading HTS commodities imported into each of the customs districts for 
three sample years.  There is clearly some persistence in the leading import categories for most 
customs districts over the three sample years.  While there are certainly changes in the specific 
percentages for individual commodities, and even changes in rank order over the sample years, the 
leading import categories are, by and large, the same for most districts over the full time period.  For 
example, commodities 87 and 84 account for approximately 47% of imports entering through 
Buffalo in 2000 and around 30% in 2008.  Commodities 87 and 27 account for around 41% of 
imports entering through Detroit in 2000 and around 45% in 2008.  Imports entering through Great 
Falls are dominated by Commodity 27 in all three years.  For Seattle, Commodities 27 and 44 
account for 55% of imports in 2000 and around 51% in 2008.  For St. Albans, commodities 85 and 
88 account for around 38% of imports in 2000 and around 34% in 2008.  On the other hand, there 
is less persistent dominance in a few commodity categories for Ogdensburg, Pembina and Portland. 
In sum, one cannot dismiss the possibility that changes over time in the transport cost ratios for 
individual customs districts reflect changes in commodity mixes within those districts; however, the 
persistence of relatively large shares accounted for by the same few commodity categories in most 
districts makes this possible explanation for why the ratio flattened out more in some districts than 
in others post-2001 less than compelling.  In particular, there were four districts identified earlier as 
showing a noticeable flattening of the cost ratio: Portland, St. Albans, Seattle, and Pembina.  With 
the arguable exception of Pembina, all show a relatively unchanged distribution of commodity 
imports.  In addition, we have conducted “what if” analyses of how the ratios would have evolved in 
time in each district if the commodity shares had remained unchanged at their beginning and end-of-
sample values. In most cases, the differences between these counterfactual constant-commodity-mix 
ratios and the actual observed ratios are small, reinforcing the inference that changing commodity 
mixes have made, at most, a relatively small contribution to the evolution of district cost ratios over 
time.   
4.3  Commodity Vulnerability to Border Security-Related Disruptions 
Yet another way in which commodity composition might be responsible for differences across 
customs districts in the transport cost ratio over time is the possibility that some commodities are 
more vulnerable to border security-related disruptions than other commodities.  In this context, 
districts that experienced a greater flattening out of the transport cost ratio post-9/11 may have had 
an import mix that is more intensive in vulnerable commodities.  One way to measure the 
vulnerability of the import mix passing through each customs districts is shown in part (a) of Table 
8.  The values reported are calculated by taking commodity-level vulnerability index values as 
estimated by Goldfarb and Robson (2003) and averaging the commodity-level values using the 
import volumes as weights for the various commodities within each district.  
Table 8(a) shows that the range of district-level vulnerability measures is relatively narrow for the 
eight districts.  More interesting, the districts where ratios showed a greater tendency to flatten-out 
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 TABLE 7: 
Top five HTS – 2 Import Commodities 
 
 Buffalo Detroit Great Falls 
 HTS % HTS % HTS % 
1989 87 37.5 87 51.6 27 56.1 
 84 11.6 84 10.9 1 1.5 
 85 4.5 48 4.5 87 5.4 
 75 4.1 76 2.8 44 4.8 
 98 3.8 85 2.4 98 3.6 
2000 87 36.7 87 32.1 27 47.7 
 84 10.0 27 8.4 85 8.1 
 85 5.3 84 8.3 2 7.5 
 98 4.7 98 5.2 98 6.6 
 39 3.5 85 4.8 44 6.3 
2008 87 22.1 87 35.3 27 70.5 
 27 20.2 27 10.0 84 6.2 
 84 7.7 84 9.4 31 4.5 
 39 4.5 76 4.8 2 2.4 
 85 3.4 39 4.1 98 2.2 
 Ogdensburg Pembina Portland 
 HTS % HTS % HTS % 
1989 87 17.7 27 13.7 3 38.7 
 48 15.1 44 9.8 47 15.3 
 76 9.4 47 9.5 27 9.0 
 84 8.1 31 7.6 48 6.7 
 98 4.6 84 6.5 44 5.3 
2000 85 13.4 85 9.3 27 23.0 
 27 10.0 27 8.7 3 20.5 
 48 9.7 44 8.5 44 9.4 
 76 5.8 87 6.6 47 67 
 71 5.5 48 6.6 48 5.5 
2008 27 19.4 27 11.3 27 41.6 
 71 9.2 84 9.1 3 16.9 
 76 9.5 31 7.7 48 5.8 
 48 7.6 39 7.6 47 4.4 
 84 5.2 10 5.1 40 4.0 
 Seattle St. Albans  
 HTS % HTS %   
1989 44 27.1 85 2   
 48 13.8 48 13.8   
 27 7.6 44 7.2   
 84 5.9 84 5.8   
 87 5.8 87 5.4   
2000 27 39.6 85 21.8   
 44 15.4 88 16.3   
 98 7.0 44 7.8   
 48 5.0 27 7.0   
 84 3.6 48 6.9   
2008 27 41.1 88 26.4   
 44 9.4 27 12.0   
 48 5.2 85 8.0   
 84 4.7 84 7.7   
 98 3.4 48 6.8   
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TABLE 8:  
Vulnerability Index Analysis 
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after 2000 (such as Portland and Seattle) also have relatively low district-level vulnerability index 
values.  The results in Table 8(a) therefore suggest that observed differences in time trends for the 
district transport cost ratios after 9/11 did not systematically reflect variation in the vulnerability of 
the districts to disruption.   If anything, there is a negative linkage between the two phenomena.   
For example, the two districts with the highest district-level vulnerability index values, Buffalo and 
Detroit, show the least evidence of a flattening out of the transport-cost ratio after 9/11. 
Perhaps a better understanding of these district-level vulnerability index results is provided by part 
(b) of Table 8 in which we report the relevant HTS number and the related estimated value of the 
Goldfarb-Robson index of the overall vulnerability of that commodity to border disruptions.  The 
Goldfarb-Robson index was calibrated on a scale of 1-10.  It should be noted that their index is 
subjectively estimated based on different attributes of a commodity such as its time sensitivity and 
its susceptibility to physical tampering. 
What is notable about the data in part (b) of Table 8 is the similarity of the index values across the 
various commodities.  Simply put, there is not much difference across major commodity imports 
from Canada in their vulnerability to border security-related disruptions.  Hence, it is not surprising 
that our results from Table 8(a) suggest that differences among customs districts in the behavior of 
the cost ratio over time don’t seem to reflect differences across customs districts in the vulnerability 
of commodity imports to border security related disruptions.  Indeed, the only commodity showing 
a relatively low vulnerability value is HTS 27 – mineral fuels.  According to Table 7, the Portland 
and Seattle customs districts show the greatest relative increase in the share of imports accounted 
for by HTS 27 between 2000 and 2008.  Yet Portland and Seattle, as noted earlier, show a post-2001 
flattening-out of the declining transport cost ratio.  In fact, the increased post-2001 importance of 
mineral fuel imports in those two districts should have contributed to a dampened impact of border-
related security disruptions and a more rapidly declining ratio.  Hence, on the basis of the evidence, 
we are led to conclude that customs districts differ in their ability to respond to border security-
related disruptions for reasons unrelated to their commodity import mixes. 
5.   OTHER DISTRICT CHARACTERISTICS  
Several other factors might be considered as possible explanations of the behavior of the 
transportation cost ratios as summarized in Figures 3-10.  One such additional factor is modes of 
shipping used in different customs districts.  Specific modes may be more or less efficient depending 
upon fuel prices, the physical infrastructure available to the mode, e.g. road surfaces, rail tracks, 
switching yards and so forth, and the economies of scale attainable by the specific mode.16  
Obviously, specific modes will also be more or less efficient depending on the specific commodities 
carried.  For example, rail is more efficient than trucks for high-weight and bulky commodities such 
as coal.   
While it is fairly straightforward for us to describe district-level differences in transportation modes, 
it is impossible for us to identify the relative efficiencies of the transportation mode configurations 
for our sample customs districts.  The factors determining the efficiencies are simply too complex; 
hence, it is not possible to evaluate directly whether and to what extent differences across districts in 
the behavior of the transport cost ratio over time reflect changes in mode availability and usage 
patterns. 
 
                                                            
16 For some empirical evidence on the importance of both transportation and communication infrastructure on  
    transport costs, see Limao and Venables (2001).   
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5.1  Modes of Transport 
It is possible to identify changes over time in modes of transportation by customs districts.  Table 9 
reports the percent of imports by transportation mode for each of the sample customs districts for 
selected years from 1996-2008.17  Specifically, Table 9 reports the unweighted average of the mode 
share for each district in each sample year.  As can be seen, trucks account for the single largest 
mode share over the sample period for all districts with the exception of Great Falls, where pipeline 
became the single largest mode beginning in 2002.  It is also clear that the share of imports 
accounted for by trucks generally declines across our sample of customs districts in the post-2000 
period.  The degree to which this occurs varies across districts.  For example, declines are quite 
notable for Portland, Seattle and Pembina.  In the case of Portland, the shift away from trucks 
appears to be towards vessels (included in the “other” category).  In the case of Seattle, the shift 
away from trucks is towards pipelines.  For Pembina, the shift from trucks is primarily towards rail.   
Since commodity shipments by truck are generally viewed as most likely to suffer increases in the 
security-related component of shipping costs, these shifts would suggest that districts such as Seattle 
and Portland should have experienced more rapid declines in the transport cost ratio over time, 
rather than the greater flattening-out that we actually observe. 
On the other hand, the shift away from trucks post-2002 is quite modest in the cases of Buffalo and 
Detroit.  It is tempting to draw an inference that the net advantages of using trucks changed more 
dramatically for Portland, Seattle and Pembina than for Buffalo and Detroit.  Interestingly, the 
former three districts also showed a more substantial flattening of the transport cost curve than did 
the latter two in the post-2002 period compared to pre-2002.  In a later section, we will consider 
possible explanations (such as the FAST program) for why the trucking mode might have been less 
adversely affected by post-2001 border security developments in Buffalo and Detroit compared to 
other districts.  At this point, one might conclude that the behavior of the transport cost ratio for 
Portland, Seattle and Pembina would have been even less favorable than identified earlier had the 
mode shifts discussed in this section not taken place.   
5.2  Location of Ports of Entry and Clearance 
As noted earlier, ideally we would like to analyze variations in transport costs at the port level 
focusing specifically on U.S. ports receiving imports from Canada.  Unfortunately, as noted in our 
introduction, requisite data to analyze transport cost differences at the port level are not available to 
researchers outside of U.S. federal government agencies.  However, since attributes of the ports 
located within customs districts can influence the calculated transportation cost ratio for each 
district, ignoring port characteristics can potentially obscure important determinants of the 
transportation cost ratio over time for individual customs districts.  
One potentially relevant attribute is the distance of ports within a district from the source of origin 
of shipments from Canada.  The greater this distance, the higher the shipping costs, other things 
constant.  Moreover, if the average shipping distance changes over time, the calculated 
transportation cost ratio for a customs district should also change, other things constant.  Hence, 
differences identified over time in the transport cost ratio when comparing customs districts may, in 
part, reflect changes in average distances of commodity shipments from points of origin in Canada 
to destination ports in each U.S. customs district.   
Average shipping distances can change either because points of origination of exports from Canada 
move further from the border and/or because imports are processed at U.S. ports further removed  
                                                            
17 The first year for which information on mode is available for our customs districts is 1995. 
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TABLE 9: 
Percent of Imports by Mode – Various Years 
 
 Percent of Imports by Mode: 1996 
District Truck Rail Pipeline Other 
Portland 58.2% 7.7% 2.7% 31.4% 
St. Albans 79.6% 9.0% 1.0% 10.4% 
Ogdensburg 81.6% 11.7% 4.2% 2.5% 
Buffalo 70.7% 26.3% 2.0% 1.0% 
Seattle 61.3% 18.4% 19.0% 1.3% 
Great Falls 54.7% 13.1% 31.8% 0.4% 
Pembina 62.3% 27.8% 7.1% 2.8% 
Detroit 66.3% 31.5% 1.9% 0.3% 
 
 Percent of Imports by Mode: 1998 
District Truck Rail Pipeline Other 
Portland 81.5% 10.6% 3.1% 4.8% 
St. Albans 87.8% 10.1% 1.2% 0.9% 
Ogdensburg 83.1% 10.4% 4.0% 2.5% 
Buffalo 67.1% 31.0% 0.8% 1.1% 
Seattle 59.4% 14.4% 23.9% 2.3% 
Great Falls 55.8% 12.4% 31.7% 0.1% 
Pembina 65.2% 28.2% 3.5% 3.1% 
Detroit 73.2% 24.7% 1.9% 0.3% 
 
 Percent of Imports by Mode: 2000 
District Truck Rail Pipeline Other 
Portland 87.8% 3.1% 3.4% 5.7% 
St. Albans 71.2% 10.6% 4.9% 13.3% 
Ogdensburg 82.8% 8.1% 5.6% 3.5% 
Buffalo 72.4% 25.2% 1.7% 0.7% 
Seattle 48.7% 12.0% 30.0% 9.3% 
Great Falls 44.1% 10.5% 45.4% 0.1% 
Pembina 67.5% 25.6% 4.0% 2.9% 
Detroit 63.6% 33.5% 2.6% 0.3% 
 
 Percent of Imports by Mode: 2002 
District Truck Rail Pipeline Other 
Portland 77.3% 3.9% 15.7% 3.2% 
St. Albans 59.7% 8.5% 3.8% 28.0% 
Ogdensburg 84.2% 7.2% 5.8% 2.8% 
Buffalo 69.3% 23.1% 7.2% 0.3% 
Seattle 68.6% 17.1% 12.3% 2.0% 
Great Falls 35.1% 9.1% 55.5% 0.3% 
Pembina 67.6% 25.6% 4.0% 2.9% 
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 Percent of Imports by Mode: 2004 
District Truck Rail Pipeline Other 
Portland 61.7% 3.4% 15.1% 19.8% 
St. Albans 64.8% 9.6% 3.2% 22.4% 
Ogdensburg 79.2% 9.5% 8.9% 2.3% 
Buffalo 64.5% 23.4% 10.7% 1.4% 
Seattle 51.6% 23.0% 19.6% 5.8% 
Great Falls 22.9% 9.8% 66.8% 0.5% 
Pembina 61.9% 32.7% 3.4% 2.0% 
Detroit 62.4% 32.9% 3.9% 0.8% 
 
 Percent of Imports by Mode:  2006 
District Truck Rail Pipeline Other 
Portland 54.2% 5.0% 15.1% 25.7% 
St. Albans 53.0% 12.6% 4.0% 30.4% 
Ogdensburg 73.1% 13.9% 10.1% 2.8% 
Buffalo 66.8% 17.7% 13.5% 2.0% 
Seattle 48.5% 21.8% 23.9% 5.8% 
Great Falls 23.1% 8.8% 67.7% 0.4% 
Pembina 57.0% 34.0% 3.5% 5.5% 
Detroit 63.5% 30.6% 5.4% 0.5% 
 
  Percent of Imports by Mode: 2008 
District Truck Rail Pipeline Other 
Portland 51.8% 5.3% 15.7% 27.2% 
St. Albans 51.0% 16.8% 5.6% 26.6% 
Ogdensburg 69.7% 13.0% 11.9% 5.3% 
Buffalo 62.0% 18.3% 15.7% 4.0% 
Seattle 41.5% 16.3% 33.3% 8.9% 
Great Falls 22.3% 9.8% 67.5% 0.4% 
Pembina 49.0% 44.1% 3.8% 3.0% 
Detroit 61.1% 29.1% 8.6% 1.2% 
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from the border.  To be sure, the bulk of imports from Canada are processed at ports located at the 
border.  Essentially all imports were processed at the border in the cases of Ogdensburg, Buffalo, 
Pembina and Detroit in 2008.  For that same year, approximately 75% of imports into the Portland 
and St. Albans districts came through ports located at the border, whereas less than 60% of imports 
into the Seattle and Great Falls districts passed through border ports. 
Commodities processed at “inland” border ports are essentially in-bond goods or mineral products 
transported by pipeline.  Since we do not have a time series for the percent of imports clearing 
through ports at the border, we cannot draw any inferences about the potential importance of 
changing shipping distances on the behavior of the transport cost ratio over time at the district level.  
However, given the growth of pipeline-related shipments into Seattle and Great Falls over the post-
2001 period, it is plausible that average shipment distances increased over the post-2001 period, at 
least for these two customs districts.18  On the other hand, given that any increases in shipping 
distances were associated with a more intense use of a mode (pipelines) whose transport costs are 
relatively insensitive to distance, it is unclear if presumed changes in shipping distances for the two 
districts would have had any substantive impact on the behavior of the transport cost ratio over our 
sample period calculated for those two districts.   Indeed, the strong increase in unit prices observed 
in the late-2000s for mineral fuels shipped by pipeline would, if anything, tend to lower transport 
costs as a fraction of the total value of the shipment. 
5.3  Concentration of Imports by Port  
The concentration of imports by port within customs districts might also have an influence on 
transportation cost differences across customs districts.  In particular, a concentration of imports 
processed by a small number of ports might provide port administrators with more political 
influence which, in turn, should better enable port administrators to acquire additional workers and 
other resources needed to restore service levels closer to those prevailing pre-9/11. This impact 
could be further amplified if the shippers and transport companies using these concentrated ports 
themselves have political influence.  Port concentration might also make those ports higher-priority 
locations for capital investments to alleviate border security-related congestion.  Finally, a 
concentration of imports in a particular geographic location could signal a corresponding 
concentration of production capacity.  The close geographic proximity of participants in 
manufacturing value chains should enable firms to coordinate responses to border-related security 
disruptions more effectively than would be possible for firms interacting with each other over 
greater distances. 
In short, we expect customs districts in which import shipments are concentrated in a few ports to 
be more able to respond effectively to border-related security disruptions.  As a result, those same 
customs districts are less likely to show a flattening-out of the transportation cost ratio in the post-
2001 period. 
In fact, there are fairly substantial differences across customs districts in the concentration of 
shipments through individual ports.  For example, essentially all imports into the Buffalo district 
enter through a single port (Buffalo-Niagara Falls).  In the case of Detroit, three ports account for 
virtually all of that district’s imports (Detroit, Port Huron and Sault Ste. Marie).  On the other hand, 
imports to the Portland and Seattle districts are distributed across a significantly larger number of 
ports.  As discussed in an earlier section of this report, the latter two districts show a noticeable 
flattening-out of the transportation cost ratio post-9/11, whereas the first two districts exhibited no 
                                                            
18 The growth of pipeline-related shipments for these two districts is presumably associated with the growth in  
    imports of mineral fuels through those two districts.   
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such flattening-out.   The evidence is thus consistent with variations in port concentration playing 
some role in explaining the observed post-9/11 differences in district-level transport-cost trends. 
5.4  FAST Availability and Utilization  
In the wake of 9/11, the U.S. and Canadian governments worked together to produce the Smart 
Border Accord, which was signed on December 12, 2001.  One program included in the Agreement 
was a harmonized commercial processing system known as Free and Secure Trade (FAST).  The 
FAST Program is designed to expedite the clearance of commercial shipments at the border for pre-
approved participants including importers, carriers and truck drivers.  In principle, participation in 
FAST allows for shipments to be cleared more quickly and with more predictability as to timing, 
since repeated and detailed security inspections at the border are not required of FAST participants.  
Hence, districts in which FAST shipments account for a relatively large share of total imports should 
enjoy lower transportation costs than districts in which FAST shipments account for a relatively low 
share of imports, other things constant.  
Unfortunately, published information on the share of imports eligible for FAST approval by port, or 
district, is unavailable.  Nor is consistent time series information readily available to allow us to 
identify the capacity of ports within each district to process commercial shipments under the FAST 
Program.  From internal documents created and supplied to us by the U.S. Customs Border and 
Protection Agency, we are able to identify when FAST became operational in different ports, the 
number of commercial lanes available for use in each of those ports, as well as the number of lanes 
dedicated specifically to FAST-approved imports.  These data are reported in Table 10 and provide  
some insight into the capabilities of ports within districts to process imports through the FAST 
Program.  Also reported in Table 10 is the percentage of shipments processed through the FAST 
Program as a share of total imports processed at the specific port.   
It can be seen that Detroit and Port Huron have relatively high proportions of FAST shipments, as 
do the Buffalo ports.  On the other hand, the two ports on the border of British Columbia and 
Washington State (Oroville and Blaine) have relatively low proportions.  This phenomenon might be 
explained by the fact that goods crossing into the ports of Detroit, Port Huron and Buffalo from 
Canada are more likely to be carried by Full-Load trucks that, in turn, are dedicated to carrying 
products manufactured by large and vertically integrated transportation equipment manufacturers.  
Conversely, goods entering through the ports of Oroville and Blaine are likely to be more varied and 
produced by smaller, non-integrated producers.  This supposition is supported by the observation 
that there is a greater use of less-than-carload (LTC) freight shipments in the Western ports than in 
the ports bordering Ontario (Bradbury and Turbeville, 2008).  Companies using LTC freight 
shipments are likely to find membership in FAST less advantageous than vertically integrated 
companies that are able to ship using full-load trucks, since shipments can only be expedited under 
FAST if all goods on a truck are shipped by FAST-approved companies.19  There are also substantial 
fixed and sunk costs associated with applying for FAST approval which makes membership in 
FAST less economical for smaller companies and shippers.  The relatively large fixed costs 
associated with receiving FAST approval might help explain the much lower percentage of 
shipments that are FAST approved in Oroville and Blaine compared to Detroit, Port Huron and 
Buffalo.  The latter districts contain the large, multinational automobile manufacturers and other 
large industrial companies for whom FAST membership is likely to be financially viable. 
 
                                                            
19 The carrier and the driver must also be FAST-approved.  See Bradbury and Turbeville (2008). 
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TABLE 10:  






Port # of Lanes 
FAST Dedicated 
Lanes 
Estimate FAST as 
% of all shipments 
Date of opening 
Detroit 14 5 44% Dec-02 
Port Huron 3 2 31% Dec-02 
Sault Ste. Marie 2 0 15% Aug-06 
Buffalo/Peace Bridge 7 0 23% Dec-02 
Buffalo/Lewiston Bridge 4 1 23% Dec-02 
Champlain 5 1 17% Dec-02 
Ogdensburg 3 0 16% Aug-06 
Massena 1 0 5% Aug-06 
Alexandria Bay 3 0 20% Jul-02 
Derby Line 2 0 13% Dec-02 
Highgate Springs 1 0 9% Dec-02 
Houlton 2 0 12% Jul-05 
Oroville 2 0 8% Aug-06 
Blaine 3 1 8% Nov-04 
Sweet Grass 2 0 3% Aug-04 
Pembina 3 0 21% Aug-03 
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There is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the effectiveness of FAST and other Trusted Trade 
Programs in facilitating faster or less costly border crossings for commercial shipments.  Moens 
(2010) suggests that many shippers who are enrolled in secure and trusted cargo and driver programs 
find little return for their investment in those programs.  In particular, trucks and truckers enrolled 
in these programs find themselves in long waiting lines to get to their expedited lanes and are pulled 
over for inspection frequently despite their “secure” status. 
Regardless of the overall effectiveness of the FAST program, it is likely that ports with a higher 
proportion of FAST shipments are more capable of mitigating border-related security disruptions 
than are ports with a substantially lower proportion of FAST shipments.20  As a consequence, the 
latter are more likely than the former to exhibit a flattening-out of the transportation cost ratio post-
2001.  Indeed, the Portland and Seattle customs districts exhibit the most marked flattening-out of 
the transportation cost ratio. 
6.  OVERALL CONCLUSIONS 
This study adds to accumulated evidence of the adverse impacts of post-9/11 border security-related 
developments on Canadian exports to the United States.  Specifically, we show that a trend of 
declining transportation costs for U.S. imports from Canada, that was quite marked in the period 
from 1990-2001, slowed significantly post-2001.  To our knowledge, this is the first study that 
directly examines transportation cost changes over time for Canada-U.S. trade flows.  Hence, it 
represents a new source of evidence on the widely discussed “thickening” of the Canada-U.S. 
border. 
Perhaps of even greater interest, our study documents that changes in transportation costs over time 
differ across U.S. customs districts receiving imports from Canada.  Specifically, the flattening-out of 
the declining transportation cost ratio post-2001 was statistically significant for certain customs 
districts but not for others.  For example, the transportation cost ratio decline slowed significantly in 
the cases of Seattle and Portland customs districts but did not slow significantly for the districts of 
Detroit and Buffalo.  In this context, our study provides some evidence that the thickening of the 
border post-9/11 is not uniform across the entire Canada-U.S. border.  Rather, border-related 
security developments seem to have caused differentiated impacts across border crossing locations. 
We consider various possible explanations for the differentiated impacts.  Most of the factors 
considered cannot plausibly account for the observed differences in geographic patterns of border 
thickening post-9/11.  The two factors whose impacts were consistent with observed changes in the 
cost ratios were the concentration of trade within a small number of ports and the availability of the 
FAST program.  Interestingly, both of these factors are “policy related” in the sense that they either 
reflect explicit policy choices (in the case of FAST) or the level of political influence (in the case of 
port concentration).  Thus, our overall story is one of regional variations in transport cost changes 
that were induced by the security response to 9/11 but whose relative regional impacts were then 
mitigated or reversed by policy-related responses.  For example, we might have expected the Detroit 
district to have suffered a greater deterioration of transport costs than the Seattle district based on 
comparisons of district-level vulnerability to disruption.  In fact, the impacts of the differential 
implementation of policies such as FAST seem to have been more than enough to offset geographic 
differences in vulnerability to disruption.  
                                                            
20 The more effective utilization of FAST by ports in the Detroit and Buffalo districts might also help explain the  
    relatively small switch away from trucking to other transport modes in those two districts. 
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The analysis provided in this paper confirms the view that there are important regional differences 
in the characteristics of cross-border transportation costs.  Our results also show that border policies 
result in differential regional impacts, even if, indeed, perhaps because, they are implemented in a 
single national program.  Taken together, our findings suggest that some regional “fine-tuning” of 
border policies might be necessary to ensure an efficient and equitable outcome of those policies 
across the various ports and districts on the Canada-U.S. border. 
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APPENDIX 1: 
Customs, Districts and Ports 
 










Fort Fairfield, ME 
Van Buren, ME 
Madawaska, ME 













Lebanon, Airport, NH 
Manchester User Fee Airport, NH 
 
St. Albans, VT 
 
St. Albans, VT 
Richford, VT 












Cape Vincent, NY 



















Swift Sure Courier 
 Service 
Binghampton Regional Airport, NY 
 
 




Salt Lake City, UT 














Del Bonita, MT 
Wildhorse, MT 






Public Airport, CO 
Eagle County Regional Airport, CO 
 
 












Port Angeles, WA 






Friday Harbor, WA 
Boundary, WA 
Laurier, WA 
Point Roberts, WA 
 
 





Metaline Falls, WA 
Olympia, WA 
Neah Bay, WA 
Seattle-Tacoma International Airport 
U.P.S 
Avion Brokers & SEATAC 
DHL Worldwide Express 
Airborne Express & SEATAC 
Yakima Air Terminal 
Grant County Airport 




























Grand Forks, ND 
Crane Lake, MN 
Lancaster, MN 
Williston Airport, ND 
Minot Airport, ND 





Port Huron, MI 
Sault Ste. Marie, MI 
Saginaw/Bay City, MI 
Battle Creek, MI 
Grand Rapids, MI 






Grand Haven, MI 
Rogers City, MI 
Detour, MI 
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APPENDIX 2: 
Sources of Data Used in the Paper 
 
Data Series Source Tables/Figures  
with Series 
Nominal value of U.S imports from 
Canada (abbreviated as “FOB value”) 
U.S. International Trade Commission DataWeb Web site. 
Series name: “General Customs Value” 
http://dataweb.usitc.gov/ 
Tables: 1, 2, 6, 7. 
Nominal value of U.S imports from 
Canada including freight and 
insurance charges (abbreviated as 
“CIF value”) 
U.S. International Trade Commission DataWeb Web site. 
Series name: “General CIF Imports Value” 
http://dataweb.usitc.gov/ 
(only used to calculate 
the trade cost ratio) 
Trade cost ratio Calculated as 100*[(CIF value – FOB value) / FOB value] Tables: 3, 4, 5, 11 
Figures: 1-11 
Goldfarb-Robson index of 
vulnerability to disruption of freight 
flows 
Appendix A from Goldfarb and Robson “Risky Business: U.S. Border Security 
and the Threat to Canadian Exports,” 
CD Howe Border Papers Series, March 2003. 
Index values by 5-digit NAICS code were converted to 2-digit HTS codes. 
Tables: 8 and 11. 
U.S. nominal imports from Canada 
by mode of transportation. 
U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics, North American Transborder Freight 
Date Web site. 
http://www.bts.gov/programs/international/transborder/TBDR_QA.html 
Table: 9. 
FAST program introduction dates 
and numbers of FAST lanes 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Table: 10. 
FAST utilization rates for the FAST 
program 
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APPENDIX 3: 
List of HTS Numbers and the Corresponding Commodity 
 
HTS Number Commodity 
1 Live animals 
2 Meat  
3 Fish and shellfish 
10 Cereals 
27 Mineral fuels 
31 Fertilizers 
37 Photographic or cinematographic products 
39 Plastics 
40 Rubber Products 
44 Wood products 
47 Pulp products 
48 Paper products 
71 Precious stones and metals 
75 Nickel products 
76 Aluminum products 
84 Mechanical machinery 
85 Electrical machinery 
87 Motor vehicles 
88 Aircraft and Spacecraft 
98 Special categories 
    
 
